EXHIBIT C

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1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF DELAWARE		
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3	IN RE:		Chapter 11
4	THE HERTZ CORPORATION, e	t al	Case No. 20-11218 (MFW)
5			Courtroom No. 3 824 North Market Street
6		•	Wilmington, Delaware 19801
7	Debtors December 28, 2020		
8			
	TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING		
9	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARY F. WALRATH UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE		
10	APPEARANCES (via Zoom):		
11			
12	For the Debtors:	Brett Haywood, Esquire RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A. 920 N. King Street Wilmington, Delaware 19801	
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we would file the fee application well in advance of Moelis earning any fee and until we have the SAPA in place we are not certain that a sale is going to go through. It simply would have been inexcusable to risk harm to the estate before we knew a sale was going to happen and before any compensation would have been earned in any event.

Moreover, as the court has seen, Moelis's compensation agreement would have revealed far too much about the target price for the sale and could not be revealed early in the process. Any supplemental application filed before the SAPA is in place would reveal too much, even if filed under seal.

Thank you, Your Honor. Unless you have any questions, we will rest.

THE COURT: No, thank you.

Anybody else?

MS. RICHENDERFER: Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. RICHENDERFER: Linda Richenderfer on behalf of the U.S. Trustee. I just wanted to respond to a couple of points there.

Regarding the idea of there being an expansion,

Mr. Gorsich mentioned. Your Honor, many of the professionals

that the debtors have retained in this case have such

provisions in their forms of order and in their engagements.

And there have been several times where FTI has come back to the court and expanded the scope of its retention.

(Indiscernible), as I just eluded to or referenced to the court.

The U.S. Trustee hasn't objected to those. We're not objecting because there was a provision that said they could expand the scope and somebody went and did so. We're objecting to the fact that when parties find it necessary to do so the assumption is that they are going to comply with the bankruptcy code, bankruptcy law, bankruptcy rules and that we're going to see a timely motion to cover the expanded services and the expanded fee. That is the problem here. We didn't see that motion.

We're not saying nothing can ever be done nunc pro tunc. I don't think I have objected -- I know I haven't' objected to anything else in this case seeking nunc pro tunc relief for the professionals that have been retained, but when its four months that is an entirely different scenario.

I think, to borrow something Mr. Gorsich said, we have to look at the totality of the circumstances here and the manner in which these facts unfolded, and the four months that went by before we saw, and before the court was asked to approve this expanded retention for this particular professional.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Well let me make my ruling on this. I am going to overrule the United States Trustees objection for a couple of reasons. First, this is not a case of retaining a professional without any court approval of that professional in the case. Moelis already has been retained in this case on a finding by this court that they are competent and disinterested.

With that said I will note that at this point there is no evidence that they are disinterested -- that they are not disinterested, but apparently the U.S. Trustee has some additional issues and questions given that the stalking horse bidder is related to Apollo and there was disclosure that Moelis had some connection with Apollo.

But I need not deny the retention application at this point on that point because to the extent it is disclosed or does appear that they are disinterested I am sure the United States Trustee will bring that to my attention. And since they are not being paid anything for their work at this time until a sale occurs there is plenty of time for the United States Trustee to explore that.

Again, on the record before me Moelis is disinterested and can be retained for this work.

With respect to the issue of whether or not the original retention covered this exact work I think it is

clear both from the language in the original retention engagement letter and the testimony presented by both the debtor and by Moelis in the form of their declarations, it was clear that a sale of less than the majority or all of the debtor was not contemplated as part of the original engagement letter. And the Donlen assets be not a significant or certainly not the majority or all of the value of the debtor fits outside of that original retention.

The original retention engagement letter, application, and this court's order all contemplated the right of the debtor and Moelis to seek to expand the services for which Moelis was retained, and as the U.S. Trustee noted, other professional's retentions add similar terms and other professionals have extended their services contingent upon the filing of a supplemental retention application and approval of the court. So, the filing of the supplemental retention application was not barred by the original retention and certainly this anticipated the filing.

I also find that *nunc pro tunc* approval of the retention for this specific part of the engagement, that is work on the sale of the Donlen assets can be granted because it does meet the extraordinary circumstances of the <u>Arkansas</u> case. This is not simply a case where the professional forgot to get retained, where a professional relied on others to file the application and they delayed or forgot to file

the retention application.

This was done purposely and the court finds that it was a reasonable exercise of the debtor's business judgement in doing so in order to protect and maximize the value of the Donlen business. I accept the testimony and the direct testimony, the live testimony, as well as the declarations that support that given the adverse effect that the debtors bankruptcy has had on the Donlen business. I disagree with the U.S. Trustees characterization of that. I think it was direct evidence of that fact and I accept it. I find it convincing.

Further, there is no prejudice to anybody. No fee for this engagement will be earned until a sale process is successfully concluded and the sale order entered. And, again, I think it was reasonable for the debtor not to file a retention application until the debtor had some reasonable expectation or assurance that the exploration of a sale of the Donlen business would be fruitful. It would have been, in my opinion, perhaps a breach of the debtor's fiduciary duty to have filed something suggesting that there might be a sale only to have it not come to fruition. That would have caused a further erosion of the business of Donlen as a value of that business.

So, I accept the debtors' decision to wait until there was some assurance that a sale might proceed

successfully before filing any application to retain Moelis.

Again, I think this is not the circumstance where Moelis is a stranger to this case. They have already been retained in the case. They have already been found to be competent to serve as the debtor's investment banker. They have already been found to be disinterested. So, I think that on the record made there is strong support for granting the request of the debtor.

Let me point out, I think <u>Acevedo</u> is clearly distinguishable not only in this case, but in many bankruptcy cases. There are many instances in bankruptcy where not only Rule 6003, but many instances where because of the notice requirements the court is unable to enter an order on no notice and will allow any relief to be *nunc pro tunc* to the filing of the retention application.

It is not creating jurisdiction in this court.

This court has jurisdiction over the retention of professionals. And, again, I think the circumstances of when the debtor decided to actually file the retention application met the requirements of the Third Circuit extraordinary circumstances in Arkansas.

So, I will overrule the objection and will grant the application, again, subject to any issue that may come up in the event that the U.S. Trustee believes that Moelis is not disinterested on this point.

I also want to thank the committee for having done 1 2 their job in reviewing the retention application. I suspect it was on all aspects, not simply on whether the fee itself 3 was appropriate. 4 5 So I will look for a form of order, Mr. Zakia or 6 Mr. Gorsich. Have you uploaded an order on that retention 7 application? 8 MR. HAYWOOD: Your Honor, for the record this is Brett Haywood of Richards Layton. 9 10 We have uploaded that order on that retention. And if I may ask, Your Honor, I believe the committee wishes 11 to raise something with you if you wouldn't mind spending a 12 13 few other minutes with us. THE COURT: Sure. 14 15 MS. HOOVER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. This is 16 Jennifer Hoover of Benesch for the record. Can you hear me? 17 THE COURT: I can. 18 MS. HOOVER: Thank you.

Briefly, Your Honor, the committee would like to address the court on some discreet matters regarding upcoming scheduling and Hertz. We have discussed this briefly with both debtor's counsel as well as Ms. Richenderfer. If you would allow the committee to proceed briefly Jonathan Wagner of Kramer Levin would like to address the court. I would note his pro hac vice was filed this morning and was entered this

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afternoon during the course of the hearing.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WAGNER: Your Honor, this is Jonathan Wagner. Can you hear me?

THE COURT: I can.

MR. WAGNER: Okay. Thank you for considering this matter. Given the holidays and the holiday schedule the committee thought it was prudent to raise with Your Honor today an issue concerning the scheduling of the bifurcation motion that was filed late on December 23rd for a hearing on January 13th. For reasons I don't need to get into now the January 13th hearing will not work. It is not conducive to a fair and efficient hearing of this important matter.

We have raised this issue with counsel to the debtors and other interested parties and we have all agreed that rather than address the scheduling issue today we would try in short order to work out a schedule. But given the time exigencies, and the holiday, and holiday schedules for the rest of the week what we would like to do is if we can't work out a schedule, let's say, by early tomorrow we would like to get a date now at Your Honor's earliest conveyance either later tomorrow or perhaps on Wednesday so that we can address the scheduling issue.

I am hopeful that we will be able to work out the scheduling, but just in case I think it would be prudent to

get a date with Your Honor either late tomorrow or on Wednesday. You should always take lawyers time predictions with a grain of salt, but I don't think it would take more than fifteen minutes of Your Honor's time in the event we can't reach an agreement.

THE COURT: Let me check with Ms. Capp. (Pause in record)

THE COURT: Well why don't I do this; I can hear you tomorrow at four o'clock. Does that work for the parties?

MR. WAGNER: That works for the committee, Your Honor.

MR. ZAKIA: Your Honor, this is Jason Zakia for the debtors. Yes, that's fine.

As counsel just mentioned they did raise with us their issues concerning scheduling. We are going to work with them over night and hopefully we will be able to resolve everybody's concerns. I can't promise at this point we will get to an agreement, but we will try our best. If not, we will see the court tomorrow at four o'clock.

THE COURT: All right. Do we want to do it by Zoom or do you just want to do a CourtCall conference, teleconference.

MR. WAGNER: From the point of view of the committee a CourtCall conference is fine.

1 MR. ZAKIA: Debtors would agree with that, Your 2 Honor. 3 THE COURT: All right. We will do it by CourtCall 4 then. 5 MR. WAGNER: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. I hope you work it out. 6 7 MR. WAGNER: Thank you. 8 THE COURT: We stand adjourned. We're done today? 9 MR. ZAKIA: That's right, Your Honor. Thank you 10 for your time. 11 THE COURT: Thank you. (A Chorus of "Thank you, Your Honor") 12 13 (Proceedings conclude at 4:36 p.m.) 14 15 16 17 CERTIFICATE 18 19 I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript 20 from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the 21 above-entitled matter. 22 /s/Mary Zajaczkowski December 29, 2020 23 Mary Zajaczkowski, CET**D-531 24 25